Irish Air Corps whistle-blower claims death toll from chemical-linked illnesses surpasses 72

A MAN WHO is taking the State to court over his time in the Air Corps believes 72 of his colleagues died prematurely, linking their deaths to alleged chemical exposure at work.

The recent death of a former airman has brought the alleged death toll to 72, according to the whistle-blower.

He also alleges that:

  • 72 verified deaths have occurred in total since 1980
  • 59 of these deaths have occurred since 2000
  • 36 of these deaths have occurred since 2010

The whistle-blower is claiming that the State neglected health and safety rules and exposed himself and his fellow workers to seriously harmful levels of toxic chemicals. This continues to be strongly contested by the State.

The whistle-blowers in this case alleges there was a disregard for the safety of young Air Corps members. According to an online resource created for those who believe they were affected by the chemical exposure, there was:

  • No meaningful chemical risk assessments.
  • No risk specific health surveillance
  • No Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) issued
  • No chemical health and safety training whatsoever
  • No reporting of health and safety incidents
  • No follow up of unusual illnesses by medical personnel
  • Ignoring dangerous air quality reports
  • Personnel doused in toxic chemicals as pranks (hazing) incidents
  • Highly toxic chemicals disposed of onsite in an unsafe manner

Read full article on The Journal website below…

Delay – Deny – Die

Dáil Éireann Written Answers 15/01/19 – Irish Air Corps – State Claims Agency Bonus Pay

Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats)

QUESTION NO: 217

To ask the Minister for Finance further to Parliamentary Question No. 146 of 18 December 2018, if the National Treasury Management Agency will provide a breakdown of all discretionary performance related payments in tabular form (details supplied); the highest discretionary performance related payments made to a single employee in each of the years 2006 to 2012; and if he will make a statement on the matter. (Details Supplied- Email sent 07/01/19 at 14:57) to include the details of discretionary performance-related payments for the following years 2006 to 2012 inclusive to include the overall total amount of remuneration and the number of employees per year that shared extra remuneration; and if the NTMA will indicate the highest discretionary performance-related payments made to a single employee in each years. 1179/19

Paschal Donohoe (Dublin Central, Fine Gael)

The response to the deputy is set out in the table.

YearTotal Bonus PayNumber of Benefiting EmployeesAverage per Benefiting EmployeeHighest Individual Bonus Pay
2006€2,807,229116€24,200
€377,000
2007€3,165,551138€22,939
€403,000
2008€3,459,751161€21,489€395,500
2009€2,751,361167€16,475€200,000
2010€1,981,760258€6,945€40,000
2011€62,6105€12,522€30,000
2012€43,1006€7,183€25,000

Notes

  • In respect of the years 2006-2010, the details provided have been compiled by the NTMA following the retrieval and review of available historical hard-copy documentation.
  • Details of the total amount paid in discretionary performance related pay along with the number of staff in receipt of these payments have been published in the NTMA Annual Report for the years 2010 to 2017 (the NTMA’s most recent Annual Report).

*****

State Claims Agency audited the Health & Safety Management Systems of the Irish Air Corps for a decade before the Health & Safety Authority intervened to prevent serious ongoing harm to Air Corps personnel. 

Over the course of this decade of auditing, the “risk profile” of the Irish Air Corps improved year on year. These “paperwork” improvements in risk profile were subsequently part of the remuneration process for personnel in the State Claims Agency and the National Treasury Management Agency

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Dáil Éireann Written Answers 15/01/19 – Irish Air Corps – State Claims Agency

Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats)

QUESTION NO: 133

To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the health and safety management system reports and or audits carried out on the Air Corps by the State Claims Agency in each of the years 2006 to 2015; the year and author of each report and or audit in the timeframe; if the reports have been published and or classified as confidential; and if he will make a statement on the matter. 1180/19

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

I am advised by the State Claims Agency that it has a statutory remit under the National Treasury Management Agency (Amendment) Act 2000 to provide risk management advices to Delegated State Authorities. Such risk management advices include the provision of Health & Safety Management System audits, inspections and reviews.

From this, State Claims Agency conducted a number of Health & Safety Management System Defence Forces audits within the Air Corps between the years 2006 – 2015. The Reports are authored by the State Claims Agency and are confidential between the Agency and their Client.

*****

The State Claims Agency audited the Irish Air Corps for a decade before the Health & Safety Authority were forced to intervene and stop the ongoing CMR & toxic chemical exposure of the Baldonnel workforce.

The HSA file was opened in January 2016 and was only closed in September 2018 but the “superb” health and safety performance of the Air Corps for the decade prior to HSA intervention helped the State Claims Agency & NTMA staff earn discretionary performance-related payments.

DELAY – DENY – DIE

72 Untimely deaths recorded in #IrishAirCorps toxic chemical scandal

Untimely* deaths of serving & former Irish Air Corps personnel

  • 72 verified deaths have occurred in total since 1980 
  • 59 of these deaths have occurred since 2000
  • 36 of these deaths have occurred since 2010
Either the rate of death is accelerating or we are missing many deaths from previous decades or possibly both.
 

3 most significant causes of death

  • Approximately a third of deaths are from  cancer
  • Approximately a third of deaths are from cardiac
  • Approximately a fifth of deaths are from suicide
*We record untimely as dying at or before age 66 (civilian pension age), average age of death is 49 years. We are counting deaths from medical reasons & suicide, we are not counting accidental deaths or murder.

Dáil Éireann Written Answers 18/12/18 – Department of Finance – State Claims Agency Bonus Pay

Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats)

QUESTION NO: 146

To ask the Minister for Finance if staff at the State Claims Agency receive discretionary performance related payments; the amount paid to staff from 2006 to date; if these payments related to particular projects and or audits; and if he will make a statement on the matter. 53022/18

Paschal Donohoe  (Dublin Central, Fine Gael)

When performing its statutory functions regarding claims against the State, the National Treasury Management Agency is known as the State Claims Agency.

The NTMA have informed me that discretionary performance-related payments are intended to reward exceptional performance having regard to the employee’s own performance, the performance of the employee’s area of responsibility, and the overall performance of the NTMA. Performance related payments are made in accordance with parameters approved by the Agency’s non-executive Remuneration Committee.

The NTMA have also informed me that it provides details of performance related payments made each year to all NTMA staff in its annual reports which are available on the NTMAs website through the following link

http://www.ntma.ie/publications

*****

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Never forget the 71+ untimely deaths from Irish Air Corps Toxic Chemical Scandal

Let us not forget the 71+ Irish Air Corps personnel who made the ultimate sacrifice NEEDLESSLY. That’s 71 sons, brothers & fathers who will never be home for Christmas ever again.

Let us think of their families & work to prevent further unnecessary deaths.

Perhaps the Irish Air Corps will work to help survivors in 2019 rather than actively denying appropriate healthcare as they have consistently done to date.

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Dáil Éireann Written Answers 18/12/18 – Irish Air Corps – State Claims Agency Audits

Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats)

QUESTION NO: 119

To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence if the State Claims Agency supplied the Health and Safety Authority with copies of its audits and or reports regarding the Air Corps; and if he will make a statement on the matter. 53026/18

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

I have been advised by the State Claims Agency that it does not provide reports of Health and Safety Management System Audits conducted by the Agency in Delegated State Authorities (including the Defence Forces) to the Health and Safety Authority. I am advised that these are provided to the Delegated State Authorities only.

With regard to the Air Corps, the Deputy will be aware that the Health and Safety Authority (HSA), following a number of inspections in 2016, issued a Report of Inspection to the Air Corps on the 21st October 2016, listing a number of matters requiring attention which included the areas of risk assessment.

The Air Corps as a consequence of this HSA report have implemented an improvement plan which is being conducted over eight phases. Seven of the eight phases have now been fully completed. The final phase is a continuous on-going process. The implementation plan focuses on a number of areas, including risk assessment.

I wish to assure the Deputy that the health and welfare of the Defence Forces personnel is a high priority for me and the military authorities.

*****

For 10 years BEFORE the Heath & Safety Authority were forced to investigate the Irish Air Corps, due to the ongoing safety risks to personnel, the State Claims Agency had been carrying out Health & Safety Risk Management System audits at Baldonnel. 

In the eyes of the State Claims Agency the Irish Air Corps risk profile was continuously improving whilst personnel on the ground were still being exposed to toxic & CMR chemicals without appropriate PPE or training causing lifelong injures to themselves and their children. 

It is now obvious that the State Claims Agency audits were incompetent  especially considering it took the Health & Safety Authority 2 years and 9 months to close their investigation file on the Irish Air Corps.

The State Claims Agency audits need to be released to the Oireachtas without delay.

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Dáil Éireann Written Answers 18/12/18 – Irish Air Corps – Legal Cases

Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats)

QUESTION NO: 117

To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the number of open cases the State Claims Agency is handling in respect of the Air Corps, its staff and former staff; and if he will make a statement on the matter. 53027/18

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

I am advised by the State Claims Agency that their reports indicate that currently the Agency is managing 21 active compensation claims in respect of the Air Corps where it is alleged that a staff member is the injured party.

Given that litigation is on-going, the Deputy will appreciate that it would be inappropriate for me to comment further in relation to these claims.

*****

Considering the limited media coverage of this scandal to date, this figure can only be expected to climb as serving & former personnel become aware that their ongoing health issues are likely a result of unprotected toxic chemical exposure whilst serving in the Irish Air Corps.

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Irish Air Corps Health & Safety officer ordered evidence of Carbon Monoxide risks destroyed.

In 1995 the Irish Air Corps commissioned an independent third party organisation to carry out air quality testing in the Engine Repair Flight building. ERF comprised the Engine Overhaul facility, the Non Destructive Testing workshop and the Machine shop. Avionics Squadron was located in the same physical building as the ERF and the open attic spaces meant  chemical vapours & fumes from either unit were free to flow in either direction.

The Avionics / ERF building was also less than 20m downwind from the 3m high Spray Paint Shop exhaust stack which exhausted benzene, hexamethylene diisocyanate, toluene and xylene.

Ambient Air Monitoring for Health & Safety at Work Report from the 2nd of August 1995 found that #Dichloromethane (also known as Methylene chloride) was found in some areas to be 175ppm. At the time The most stringent health and safety limits for #DCM were 50 ppm (TWA for 8 hours) and 126 ppm (STEL for 15 minutes).

Personnel, including other ranks employed in the Formation Safety Office, were never informed of these results. Avionics / ERF personnel were left in situ for a further 12 years before the workshops were finally condemned & demolished and needlessly exposed to #DCM and other chemicals.

Significantly Dichloromethane metabolises as Carbon Monoxide once inhaled but is lethal in many other different ways.  We have at least 10 untimely deaths of men who worked in this building alone, their average age of death was 49.3 years and the youngest was only 32.

*****

So we have one state body warning the general public about the dangers of Carbon Monoxide, while another state body hid evidence of a known carbon monoxide threat from personnel working in a heavily contaminated facility.

Delay – Deny – Die

Dáil Éireann Written Answers 4/12/18 – Department of Defence – Air Corps senior management withheld Trike Report from government appointed investigator

Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats)

QUESTION NO: 108

To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence if a report on the use of Trikelone N in the Air Corps workshop compiled in 2014 by the formation safety office of the Air Corps was made available to the independent person (details supplied) appointed to investigate health and safety matters in the Air Corps; if not, the reason it was not available to them; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [50343/18]

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

The report of the independent person appointed to investigate health and safety matters in the Air Corps is published and available on my Department’s website. Appendix C of that report lists documents and materials consulted and reviewed by him.

The document, to which the Deputy refers, is the subject of legal advice and in light of ongoing litigation, I am not in a position to comment further.

*****

Introduction

Trikelone N is a vapor de-greaser which was used as a cleaning agent in the process of cleaning engine parts due to be overhauled. Its use was  discontinued in the Air corps just prior to September 2007.

Work practices

One (1) pair of gloves was available to be used between all personnel who could be required to carryout the process. No personnel P.P.E. issue was made to individuals. MSDS sheets were available but no records of training on the dangers of using Trikelone N or the process or how to properly carryout the process exists. Two large extractor fans were placed on the wall behind where the process took place, but there is no record of the capacity of the fans, their specification or if they were adequate. There was no organised segregation of work areas. The double doors that separated the area where the Degreasing process took place from the adjoining area here normally left open. The personnel’s tea making and meeting room was in an annex off this adjoining Engine assembly area. The workshop heating system was also located in the adjoining Engine assembly area. Originally peoples personnel lockers were located in the immediate area where the Degreasing process took place, but the lockers where relocated into the adjacent Engine assembly area at a later date.

Possible Trikelone N exposure sources

Current Trikelone N MSDS states that exposure through, skin, hair, eyes and inhalation should be avoided and that contaminated clothes should be removed.

  • Trikelone N exposure through inhalation, skin, hair and eyes could have resulted as individuals were not issued P.P.E. to protect against the substance. Due to the lack of records it can not be assumed that the two fans located on the wall behind where the process took place offered adequate ventilation.
  • The lack of organised segregation of work areas where doors between areas were left open meant that vapours could travel from one area to another. No seals or segregation areas existed.
  • Vapours could have travelled to the personnel’s tea making and meeting room which was located in an annex off the adjoining Engine assembly area and could have resulted in ingestion of the chemical by way of food contamination.
  • The location of people’s personnel lockers which were located in the immediate area where the Degreasing process took place, and then relocated into the adjacent Engine assembly area at a later date. Would give a reasonable assertion that the contamination of persons clothes contained in their lockers would have taken place.
  •  The heater located in the Engine assembly area took air in just above floor level and pushed out hot air above head height circulating the air around the Engine assembly area. When the doors between the Engine assembly area and the area in which the De-greasing took place were left open, the air would be circulated between both areas. Due to the Trikelone N being heavier than air a high concentration of Trikelone N would have been located near the heaters inlet vents.
  •  The heater was adapted by Cpl. XXXXX so that the air being heated would be circulated into various other areas in the building including the Machine Workshop, NTD bay and Workshop offices by way of ventilation duct which could have exposed a risk of contamination of the air in those locations that might not have occurred previously. There is no record available if this work was approved, who authorised it, or was the design appropriate.
  • Due to the fact that Trikelone N expands when heated, the risk of explosion
    increased when the Trikelone N contaminated air passed through the  heater.
  • Poor hygiene controls before food consumption and going to the toilet would also be a cause of exposure.

Controls

The following controls are currently recommended when using Trikelone N.

  • Isolating controls should be put in place to limit exposure.
  • Adequate ventilation and extraction should be in place.
  • Do not use in a confined space as vapour is heavier than air.
  • Appropriate P.P.E to be provided including overalls, boots, chemical eye protection, impervious gloves and organic vapour respirator.
  • Wash hands before smoking, eating, drinking or using the toilet.
  • Contaminated clothes to be washed.

The Defence Forces Safety Standards 1991 which were a precursor to the Defence Forces Safety Statement is the closest thing I could find regarding some form of documented control standard in the Defence Forces. The Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 1989 would have been in affect, but the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (Chemical Agent) Regulations 2001 would have only been in affect for a short period of the exposure. The Defence Forces Safety Standards 1, Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) covers…

Section 1 Information Sources
  • MSDS sheets should be given by suppliers of Chemicals to the Defence
    Forces.
Section 3 Principles of Assessment
  • Obtaining and Passing on knowledge about a Chemical
  • Assessment of Hazards posed by its use, byproducts, storage and disposal.
  • Control of the Chemical using Engineering techniques, safe operating procedures and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
  • Monitoring the Effectiveness of the Control strategy.
Section 4 Control

Documents how controls are to be put in place using a hierarchy of Controls
not unlike what is currently used.

  • Elimination
  •  Substitution
  • Enclosure
  • Isolation
  • Local exhaust ventilation and reduced time exposure
  • Dilution ventilation
  • Use of PPE
  • Personnel hygiene and washing facilities
  • Training

Summary

As time, processes and technology has changed It is clear that the appropriate controls that would be the standard today were not in place at the time of the process taking place and that potential exposure risks were prevalent. The question posed should be was everything reasonably practicable done to ensure personals safety and health at the time.

On that note did the controls deemed reasonable at the time mirror those deemed reasonable in the present. Can the Defence Forces be found not to have done everything reasonably practicable?

DELAY – DENY – DIE