94 Untimely deaths recorded in Irish Air Corps toxic chemical exposure tragedy

Untimely* deaths of serving & former Irish Air Corps personnel

  • 94 verified deaths have occurred in total since 1980 
  • 81 of these deaths have occurred since 2000
  • 57 of these deaths have occurred since 2010
Either the rate of death is accelerating or we are missing many deaths from previous decades or possibly both.
 

3 most significant causes of death

  • 40% of deaths are from cancer
  • 27% deaths are from cardiac issues
  • 16% of deaths are from suicide (at least 15 suicides)
*We record untimely as dying at or before age 66 (civilian pension age), average age of death is 52 years. We are counting deaths from medical reasons & suicide, we are not counting accidental deaths nor murder.

AIR RAGE Dangerous chemicals have caused deaths of 90+ former members of Defence Forces, TD claims

TWO former members of the Defence Forces have died in the last month as a result of dangerous exposure to dangerous chemicals, a TD has claimed.

Wicklow TD John Brady has expressed concern over reports that another two former members of the Defence Forces passed away in recent weeks, after working with dangerous chemicals during their time of service with the Air Corps.

This brings the figure to over 90 former members of the Defence Forces who have reportedly died prematurely as a consequence of exposure to dangerous chemicals.

Mr Brady, Sinn Féin spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Defence, said: “Following their dangerous exposure to chemicals during their service in the Air Corps, a considerable cohort of former members have developed serious health issues.

“It is probable that there have been over 90 deaths as a consequence. “Many of those who have succumbed to illness have suffered from cancer and neurological problems, and other chronic conditions, many of which have proven to be life altering for sufferers.“ “Many are also at high risk of developing early onset Alzheimer’s disease.

“Young Air Corps members, many of them apprentices, were expected to handle dangerous chemicals without appropriate, or indeed in some cases any, safety equipment or clothing.

“There is an ongoing court case since 2013. At every juncture the government has dragged its heels. It has delayed the handing over of important paperwork, despite being ordered by the court to do so. “The fact that the court case is still ongoing has been used by the government as a means to hide from answering important questions on the issue.“

“The priority at this stage has to be the prevention of further unnecessary suffering, or death, amongst members of the Defence Forces, through continued exposure to chemicals. “We also need to see that the quality of life of those that are currently suffering is improved.

“These individuals deserve fairness, and they deserve justice. “I am calling on the government to come clean on this matter. There is international precedence that can be followed here.“

Global Issue

“The Air Forces of the Netherlands and Australia have previously dealt with similar issues arising out of exposure to the same chemicals, with competence, urgency, and in a manner that was fair and just.

“The government must introduce measures to assist those who have fallen ill, along with a screening programme for all who have been exposed to these chemicals.”

Whistle-blower Gavin Tobin, who worked as a technician with the Air Corps, has previously wrote to then-Minister for Defence Simon Coveney about the issue of chemicals in 2015.

Read full article by Aoife Bannon at the Irish Sun website
https://www.thesun.ie/news/7933878/air-corps-defence-forces-chemicals-sinn-fein/

*****

35 men & 1 woman have died since a protected disclosure was made to Minister Simon Coveney in 2015. Absolutely nothing has been done to provide targeted healthcare for  exposed personnel since this date despite damning findings by the HSA which the Department of Defence continue to downplay.

Was the Engine Shop / Avionics complex at Irish Air Corps condemned before demolition?

We revisit an old Parliamentary Question that was never fully resolved.

Personnels say ERF/Avionics was condemned and placed out of bounds, previous junior minister says no record of this.

Perhaps Simon Coveney could “ask someone”?

Written answers – Wednesday 5th July 2017- Department of Defence Properties

Lisa Chambers (Mayo, Fianna Fail)

269. To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the reason or fault for which a building (details supplied) was condemned and ordered out of bounds to all personnel; the date on which the building was condemned; the person that signed the order condemning the building; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [31724/17]

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

I have been advised by the military authorities that it is not possible to provide the information requested by the Deputy within the allocated time. However, I have requested that the information be sourced as a matter of urgency and I will reply to the Deputy as soon as it is available.

No further response

Written answers – Thursday 12th October 2017 – Department of Defence Properties

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)

188. To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the reason or fault for which a building (details supplied) at Casement Aerodrome, Dublin was condemned and ordered out of bounds to all personnel; the date of condemnation; the person that signed the order condemning the building; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [43216/17]

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

I have been advised by the military authorities that the former ERF Avionics building, which was a mixed brick and prefabricated structure, was demolished in 2009 as a direct result of the completion of more permanent, bespoke designed workshops in 2007.

They have further advised that following a review of records at the relevant locations within the Defence Forces that no known documentation exists indicating that this building was ever condemned or placed out of bounds prior to being demolished.

*****

The ERF / Avionics complex was highly contaminated and placed out of bounds in September 2007. Air Corps engineers where also actually fearful that the building would collapse during use.

However, in 2008 rooms on the Avionics side were pressed into use as indoor training areas for the Air Corps College. These indoor training areas shared contaminated air with ERF through interlinked open attic spaces thus further exposing personnel in an unprotected manner to dangerous chemical fumes such as dichloromethane.

Also in 2008 personnel who served in ERF sought their medical files from the Defence Forces and subsequently in early 2009 the building was demolished. 

DELAY – DENY – DIE

93 Untimely deaths recorded in Irish Air Corps toxic chemical exposure tragedy

Untimely* deaths of serving & former Irish Air Corps personnel

  • 93 verified deaths have occurred in total since 1980 
  • 78 of these deaths have occurred since 2000
  • 56 of these deaths have occurred since 2010
Either the rate of death is accelerating or we are missing many deaths from previous decades or possibly both.
 

3 most significant causes of death

  • 40% of deaths are from cancer
  • 27% deaths are from cardiac issues
  • 16% of deaths are from suicide (at least 15 suicides)
*We record untimely as dying at or before age 66 (civilian pension age), average age of death is 52 years. We are counting deaths from medical reasons & suicide, we are not counting accidental deaths nor murder.

“A force to be reckoned with” how the State Claims Agency have skin in the game of the Irish Air Corps toxic chemical exposure scandal!

Health and Safety Times Issue 19 2007

A Force to be Reckoned With

The Defence Forces (DF) has become the first State organisation to have its safety management systems validated in an audit carried out by the State Claims Agency (SCA). The independent audit, which was carried out throughout 2006, is based on best practice standards such as OHSAS 18001, HS(G)65, AIRMIC and AS/NZS 4360:24.

At the presentation of health and safety compliance certificates to various DF units, Armn Billy Galligan’s photo shows (l-r): Col Brendan Farrelly (DDFT); Comdt Bob Corbett (DF H&S Offr); Gemma D’Arcy, lead investigator, SCA; Col Paul Pakenham (DFHQ); Maj Gen Dermot Earley (D COS Sp); Adrian Kearns (director, SCA); Brig Gen Pat O Sullivan (GOC DFTC); Pat Kirwan (head of risk and operations, SCA); Brig Gen Chris Moore (A COS Sp) and Lt Col ??

Certificates of compliance were awarded on 27th February (2007), verifying that proper health and safety management structures are in place throughout the Defence Forces.

A photograph taken in December 2007, the year after the State Claims Agency initial audits, showing cresylic acid and hexavalent chromium running down the walls. This was 10 months after Certificates of Compliance were awarded verifying that proper health & safety structures are in place throughout the Defence Forces. The small barrel dissolving itself contains hydrofluoric acid.

“The audit involved an examination of the safety management systems in Defence Forces headquarters, each of the six Defence Forces formations of East, West, South, the Defence Forces Training Centre (Curragh Camp), the Naval Service and Air Corps and in 16 units selected by the auditors from throughout the Defence Forces,” explained Comdt Bob Corbet, staff officer, health and safety.

This was the first time that DF safety systems had been audited. Over the last few years, the Forces had put in place various initiatives to improve its safety management systems and it was felt that these would satisfy the SCA requirements. “Firstly, we computerised our accident and incident reporting and administrative systems and that facilitated the gathering of accident and incident information, which in turn facilitated accident investigation,” explained Corbet. “We wanted to be in a position to comply with the 2005 legislation before it actually came into force.

The collapse of a technician in 2015 while preparing a Pilatus for the 1916 centenary commemoration fly-past and the subsequent chemical induced pneumonia caused to an NCO who came to the technician’s aid was the trigger for a complaint to the Health & Safety Authority. Neither injuries in this  incident were reported to the HSA as mandated by law. So much for the computerisation of accident and incident reporting.

AUDIT PROCESS

Once all these systems were in place, the State Claims Agency began its audit, which took almost a year. Pat Kirwan, head of risk and operations with the SCA, was one of the auditors, along with Gemma D’Arcy, lead risk manager. The State Claims Agency was established under the National Treasury Management Agency (Amendment) Act 2000. “Our remit includes the provision of risk management advices to the State authorities in order to prevent claims against the State,” explained Kirwan.

“With larger State authorities like the Defence Forces, An Garda Síochána, the Dept of Agriculture and the Irish Prison Service, we establish Risk Management Liaison Groups, so we can work in conjunction and consultation with them on risk management issues. We’ve a very claims focused view.”

Photo of dichloromethane (DCM) as stored by Irish Air Corps in 2015. DCM, which is metabolized in the liver as carbon monoxide after inhalation, was banned in the EU in 2012. DCM is capable of a range of health effects that the Air Corps were aware of such as cardiotoxicity & neurotoxicity. In 1995 an independent Air Quality investigation was commissioned by Capt. (now Lt. Col.) John Maloney at Engine Repair Flight. This investigation found DCM levels as high as 175ppm when the safe limit was 50ppm. Personnel who worked in ERF we never informed of this adverse finding nor the danger to their health.

When the SCA began its audit of the Defence Forces, it looked at the main issues which it felt could lead to large numbers of claims. “We then looked at the management process within the Defence Forces because, in order to have advices and recommendations adopted and effect real change, the systems for managing change and managing risk also had to be examined,” Kirwan continued.

According to Kirwan, the Defence Forces lead the way in health and safety risk management. “We see risk management systems accreditations as the way forward; it’s very much in keeping with the requirements of the 2005 Act and good risk management and claims management practice,” he said. “The SCA audit system is based on the OHSAS 18001, HS(G)65, AIRMIC and AS/NZS 4360:24 systems and has similar criteria. We’re experts in  these areas and we can say to the Defence Forces, as an independent body, that we feel that its systems meet best practice standards. The audit is a way of driving improvement, getting people interested and awarding achievement as well.”

It should be noted that personnel in the Risk Management Section of the State Claims Agency were eligible for  performance related gratuities aka “bonus pay” for improvements in the risk profile of organisations under their remit. Improvements that were so extensive Irish Air Corps personnel were still collapsing from lack of PPE a decade into State Claims Agency oversight.

Seán Sherlock (Cork East, Labour)
141. To ask the Minister for Finance if personnel employed by the State Claims Agency branch of the National Treasury Management Agency are eligible for bonus payments; and if so, the way in which these bonuses are structured and attained. [51615/17]

Paschal Donohoe (Dublin Central, Fine Gael)
The National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) has informed me that it operates a discretionary performance-related payments scheme for eligible employees, which includes staff assigned to the State Claims Agency. The scheme rewards exceptional performance having regard to the employee’s own performance, the performance of the employee’s area of responsibility and the overall performance of the NTMA. Performance-related payments are made in accordance with parameters approved by the Agency’s non-executive Remuneration Committee. The overall amount of performance related payments made in respect of any year is also subject to the approval of the Remuneration Committee.

https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2017-12-05/141/#pq_141

The audit took the best part of a year because the SCA auditors had to sample the Forces’ key functions that impact on health and safety such as training, operations, procurement, engineering, buildings and the input of senior officers. The SCA audited the safety function in all the formations within the Forces, including the three army brigades, the Defence Forces Training Centre (Curragh), the Air Corps, the Naval Service and the Defence Forces’ Headquarters. “We then sampled at least two but usually three units on the ground within each of the formations, so a total of 16 units were audited,” explained Kirwan.

The audit examined safety policy and documentation; training; objective setting and planning; methods of monitoring and checking on progress; and methodologies for audit and review of systems. Essentially, it validated that the Defence Forces has in place the necessary systems to ensure continuous improvement in occupational health and safety standards.

The Defence Forces got the results of the audit just before Christmas, which was a relief to Corbet as he was due to leave for a six-month tour of duty to Kosovo in early April. “It was great to know the outcome before I headed off,” he said. “The criteria are quite strict and it was very satisfying to have our risk management systems recognised and accredited. There was quite a bit of work involved in it and it took a lot of commitment, and it was a lot of work for the auditors, too. We really appreciated their feedback”

A recently installed outdoor gymnasium at Baldonnel, ironically installed on the site of the old Engine Repair Flight. As can be seen in this photo the outdoor training area used by men & women of the Air Corps is located approximately 10 meters from the exhaust of the Spray Paint facility which exhausts such toxic vapors as benzene, toluene, xylene, hexavalent chromium & hexamethylene diisocyanate to name put a few.

Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Dublin South Central, Sinn Fein)
149. To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the person or body that chose the installation location of the recently installed outdoor gymnasium at Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel, County Dublin. [43855/20]

150. To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the way in which the Air Corps formation safety office allowed a leisure facility such as the new outdoor gymnasium at Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel, County Dublin, to be installed 15 m to 20 m from the low level exhaust stack of the Air Corps spray paint facility; if the exhaust stack routinely emits chemicals that are carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic to reproduction; and if he has full confidence in the current Air Corps chemicals health and safety regime. [43856/20]

151. To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the cost of the new outdoor gym; the cost of installation; and the potential cost of relocating it to a safer alternative location at Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel, County Dublin. [43857/20]

Simon Coveney (Cork South Central, Fine Gael)
I propose to take Questions Nos. 149 to 151, inclusive, together.

The Deputy will be aware that three protected disclosures were received in late 2015 and January 2016 in relation to the Air Corps. Legal advice was sought and an independent reviewer was appointed. The Reviewer’s independent report considered the Defence Forces health and safety regime, its current policy and its application. Although the report found that the Defence Forces regime appears to be capable of meeting statutory requirements, it makes a number of observations; including in relation to documentation, health surveillance, and exposure monitoring. It also notes that the Health and Safety Authority (HSA) is the appropriate statutory body to deal with such allegations. The report of the independent reviewer was provided to the individuals who made the protected disclosures and it was also published on the Department of Defence website.

In parallel to the independent review, following an inspection in 2016 by the HSA, the Air Corps had continued to work with the HSA to improve its health and safety regime. The HSA has formally noted the considerable progress made to-date by the Defence Forces towards implementation of a safety management system for the control of hazardous substances. The HSA has now closed its investigation. However, it must be noted that in the Air Corps health and safety is a matter of ongoing monitoring, supervision and adjustment.

I am advised by my military authorities that the facility referred to by the Deputy is in fact an outdoor training area as distinct from an outdoor Gym. This equipment was installed at a cost of €21,918 including the necessary site works. I am further advised that the Defence Forces do not plan to relocate the equipment elsewhere as they are not aware of any safety concerns pertaining to the current location.

The SCA will return to the Defence Forces this year (2007) to carry out a maintenance audit. This time, the auditors will examine a smaller sample of functions but will look at some in more detail.

“We got nothing but the utmost cooperation from DF personnel over the course of the audit. They’ve taken a very pro-active approach,” said Pat  Kirwan. “After dealing with the Defence Forces for a period of time, we recognised that it was at the stage where, with a certain amount of work, it would very quickly meet the best practice international standards. When the Defence Forces sets about doing something, it tends to be done correctly,” he concluded.

Health and Safety Times Issue 19 2007 – A Force to be Reckoned With

This post is based upon an article written by Mary Anne Kenny and was published in  Health & Safety Times issue 19 of 2007. A PDF of the complete article may be downloaded here.

To recap a quick timeline of the Irish Air Corps toxic chemical exposure tragedy and the State Claims Agency’s involvement.

  • August 1995 – Irish Air Corps receive report of an “Ambient Air Monitoring for Health & Safety at Work” commissioned by Capt. (now Lt. Col.) John Maloney. The independent report found that airborne levels of dichloromethane were detected at levels of 175ppm when the safe level was 50ppm. No action was taken to remedy this danger and personnel were not informed of the adverse test outcome.
  • January 1997 – Irish Air Corps receive a further report “Monitoring Air Contaminants in Work Shops” which was commissioned by Lt. (now Comdt.) Colin Roche. This testing was carried out by state body Forbairt. This report also found numerous health & safety shortcomings and recommended personnel be issued with adequate PPE and provided with chemical handling training. The Irish Air Corps finally said they would comply with this by December 2017 after HSA instructed them to do so a mere 20 years later. Hundreds were unnecessarily exposed in the intervening two decades.
  • 2006 – The State Claims Agency commenced continuous Health & Safety auditing of the Irish Air Corps
  • February 2007 – The State Claims Agency validated the Defence Forces Safety Management Systems to be in accordance with best practice standards such as OHSAS 18001, HS(G)65, AIRMIC and AS/NZS 4360:24. Certificates of compliance were awarded verifying that proper health and safety management structures are in place throughout the Defence Forces.
  • November 2013 – Dept of Defence first notified of an intention to claim against the Irish Air Corps alleging injuries caused by unprotected chemical exposure.
  • February 2014 – Irish Air Corps conduct their own internal retrospective investigation into ERF facility. Also shortly after the first legal case commenced State Claims Agency officials met with former ERF personnel at the Apprentice Hostel Auditorium at Casement Aerodrome. At this meeting the State Claims Agency discovered that the lack of risk assessments, lack of PPE and lack of chemical handling training was a LIVE issue and not a legacy issue as previously believed. At this point the State Claims Agency had the opportunity to alert the HSA to these failing and have ongoing needless exposure stopped. However, for reasons unknown, the State Claims Agency chose not to intervene to stop ongoing exposure. Not their job apparently.
  • November 2015  – Two technicians are injured by an unprotected exposure to n-hexane solvent while installing smoke generators into a Pilatus PC9m. This incident was not notified to the HSA as they are legally obliged.
  • November 2015 – PDFORRA National Health & Safety officer wrote to the DF SO Health & Safety Re: Concerns about the provision of adequate health surveillance for members in the Irish Air Corps
  • December 2015 – Serving & former Irish Air Corps personnel made complaints to the HSA as well as Protected Disclosures to Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney alleging wholesale breaches of the 1989 & 2005 Health & Safety at Work Acts. Breaches alleged included lack of chemical risk assessments, lack of job specific health surveillance, lack of PPE, lack of chemical handling training, lack of reporting of incidents, lack of reporting of spillages, disposal of toxic chemicals by dumping in the ground and pouring down sinks etc.
  • January 2016 – Health & Safety Authority commenced an investigation into the Irish Air Corps at Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel.
  • June 2016 – The Head of Department, Dept of Mechanical Aeronautical and Biomedical Engineering in the University of Limerick was alerted to the fact that scores of UL students seconded to Casement Aerodrome on work experience were likely exposed to a dangerous working environment. The response was “Please do not contact me or my office again”.
  • October 2016 – Another protected Disclosure was made to Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Mark Mellett alleging that a highly dangerous chemical, Ardrox 666, which contained dichloromethane, sodium chromate & cresylic acid had been dumped in the ground for years where Main Technical Stores was subsequently built. The Chief of Staff was also alerted to health problems suffered by personnel of MTS (& their children) that could possibly be linked to exposure. No action was taken on foot of this Protected Disclosure.
  • October 2016 – Health & Safety Authority issue report of their investigation of the Irish Air Corps and brought to their attention safety, health & welfare matters that they asked receive the Irish Air Corps “immediate attention”. The HSA warned the Irish Air Corps that if their advice was not heeded they could face further enforcement action including prosecution.
  • September 2017 – Health & Safety Authority write to Irish Air Corps recognising the high level of co-operation “and to acknowledge the considerable progress made towards the implementation of a safety management system for the control of hazardous substances that meets commendable standards”.
  • January 2018 – Protected disclosure made to Junior Minister for Defence Paul Kehoe listing 56 verified untimely deaths of serving & former Air Corps personnel who had died at or before age 66. This list excluded those who died from accidents or murder.
  • September 2018 – Health & Safety Authority “close the file” on Irish Air Corps opened three years earlier in December 2015.

Initial letter from Health & Safety authority to Irish Air Corps may be downloaded here. The Safety Data Sheet for Ardrox 666 may be downloaded here.

*****

Hopefully the above article provides readers a good overview of the involvement of the State Claims Agency in the auditing of Irish Air Corps Health & Safety.

The lead case in legal actions against the state was commenced in January 2014 and after judgements in the High Court, the Court of Appeal and a five judge sitting of the Supreme Court the case is now in its 8th year of legal discovery.

In the case of Gavin Tobin versus the Minister for Defence, Ireland and the Attorney General the Judgment of Mr. Justice Clarke, Chief Justice, delivered the 15th July, 2019 can be read here

 

Air Corps members were ‘exposed to toxic chemicals’

Two more (unfortunately 3 now) ex-Air Corps members who may have been exposed to toxic chemicals while in the Defence Forces have died in the past month, a former employee has said.

Whistleblower Gavin Tobin, who worked as a technician with the Air Corps, has claimed more than 90 former colleagues have now died prematurely and fears their deaths could have been due to the effects of cancer-causing chemicals.

Read full article by Rodney Edwards  on Sunday Independent website…https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/news/air-corps-members-were-exposed-to-toxic-chemicals-41049792.html

*****

33 men and 1 woman have died since a protected disclosure was made to Minister Simon Coveney in 2015. Absolutely nothing has been done to provide targeted healthcare for  exposed personnel since this date despite damning findings by the HSA which the Department of Defence continue to try to downplay.

If anyone who has lost a loved one before age 66, who had worked in the Irish Air Corps as military or civilian personnel or as work experience students please feel free to contact the Irish Independent journalist Rodney Edwards via email to [email protected] 

If you are serving or former personnel and if you are sick because of your service or if were or are being bullied for being sick please consider emailing Rodney too.

92 Untimely deaths recorded in Irish Air Corps toxic chemical exposure tragedy

Untimely* deaths of serving & former Irish Air Corps personnel

  • 92 verified deaths have occurred in total since 1980 
  • 79 of these deaths have occurred since 2000
  • 55 of these deaths have occurred since 2010
Either the rate of death is accelerating or we are missing many deaths from previous decades or possibly both.
 

3 most significant causes of death

  • 40% of deaths are from cancer
  • 27% deaths are from cardiac issues
  • 16% of deaths are from suicide (at least 15 suicides)
*We record untimely as dying at or before age 66 (civilian pension age), average age of death is 52 years. We are counting deaths from medical reasons & suicide, we are not counting accidental deaths nor murder.

91 Untimely deaths recorded in Irish Air Corps toxic chemical exposure tragedy

Untimely* deaths of serving & former Irish Air Corps personnel

  • 91 verified deaths have occurred in total since 1980 
  • 78 of these deaths have occurred since 2000
  • 54 of these deaths have occurred since 2010
Either the rate of death is accelerating or we are missing many deaths from previous decades or possibly both.
 

3 most significant causes of death

  • 40% of deaths are from cancer
  • 27% deaths are from cardiac issues
  • At least 15 deaths are from suicide
*We record untimely as dying at or before age 66 (civilian pension age), average age of death is 52 years. We are counting deaths from medical reasons & suicide, we are not counting accidental deaths nor murder.

Organisational Development and Management of Change in the Irish Air Corps

This study goes back to 1995 and the commencement of research by Flt. Sgt Irvine Ferris (Retd). The title of the research is Organisational Development and Management of Change in the Irish Air Corps and was concluded in 1997.

The thesis will be published over a number of weeks due to its physical size starting with chapter 8, the final chapter. The research findings are still valid today even though the original study commenced 26 years ago.

Irvine Ferris retired from the Air Corps in 1999 after 24 years service and went on to further study. He also held appointments at university and at senior management level in organisations questing for change. Irvine, now resides in Spain and England and continues with research into many interest areas.

Irvine is living with Parkinson’s disease having been diagnosed in 2015.

*****

Chapter 8

General Summary and Conclusions

Introduction

This chapter gives an overall summary of the study and where appropriate recommendations will be made in areas where they are further research a comprehensive list of recommendations will also be afforded.

General Information

The research undertaken shows that the Air Corps is a male dominated working environment. Only nine females are currently employed as military members of the organisation. It is important to note that only three females responded to the survey. The majority of respondents who replied to the attitudinal survey are aged between 24 to 27, followed closely by personnel in the age category 36 to 39. Many of the respondents are married and the standard of education is high in terms of personnel possessing the Leaving Certificate and Technical Certificate standard of education. Many of the subjects under study are pursuing a variety of part time studies. Twenty-two percent of respondents are in the long service category of 20 to 23 years of service in the Air Corps. All units of the Air Corps are represented in this study. Non-commissioned officers, in the rank grade Corporal and Sergeant, constitute the most significant proportion of the sample under study followed by Air-persons. A very large number of respondents in the social survey sample intend to take long term careers in the Air Corps. Only a minority of the respondents are graduates of the Air Corps Apprentice College. Many of the respondents hold technical jobs while the remainder are classified as line occupations under various headings.

Career Potential

In this empirical research, I have discovered the following problem areas require action by management at senior Commissioned Officer level in the Air Corps.

Promotion in the Air Corps is very sluggish and is really a haphazard affair. The current 85% embargo on promotions in the Defence Forces should be lifted immediately. Many of the personnel under study want to see the development of a career structure in the Air Corps. This is further supported by the respondents who indicate that the opportunity of career advancement in the organisation is very poor. The call to have more NCOs commissioned as officers from the ranks is very significant in this study. A very large number of personnel are in disbelief and amazed why senior ranking officers of the Air Corps do not recommend a return to NCO pilots. A large number of commissioned officer pilots are requesting to resign from the Air Corps. The situation is so serious that it is impinging on the future development of the Air Corps. Currently, up to ten fully qualified pilots are ready and waiting within the enlisted ranks and are prepared to fly military service aircraft. If senior management of the organisation decided to use this pool of untapped potential, then after a short period of re-orientation, all of the pilots could be used gainfully by the Air Corps.

Despite the lack of a career structure in the organisation, many of the respondents are prepared to accept extra responsibility. The analysis undertaken, shows personnel would like to be highly specialised in some specific functional or technical area. It was not surprising to discover that the majority of personnel believe there is insufficient opportunity to develop and learn new skills in the Air Corps. A very large number of personnel want to reach a level in terms of rank where their decisions make a difference to the out turn of the functionality of the Air Corps. This can be contrasted with the reality of the current working environment that people who work well in the Air Corps receive no recognition.

The above analysis of the career potential of Air Corps personnel is very poor in terms of promotional activity, progressive career skilling, and the lack of opportunity afforded to people to improve or to learn new skills. In chapter five of this study, I stated that a dynamic career structure provides work enjoyment and life satisfactions. Organisational members regard this to mean that the intrinsic values can be contributed by providing sufficient openings for abilities, needs, values, interests character traits, and self-concepts.

I agree with the definition applied by Super and Hall (1978), in chapter five of this study when it is applied to the Air Corps. The authors confirm that a career is a sequence of positions occupied by an individual over a lifetime or time shared with an organisation. Hall (1986), also takes the view which I acknowledge that “failing to plan is planning to fail”.1 This is the situation in the above analysis. Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps cannot plan careers through no fault of their own. The organisation is currently misaligned in terms of professional management techniques. This will become apparent as this chapter develops. One section of the workforce, that is, Commissioned Officers have a career based on task allocation and career development for Enlisted Personnel is a ‘hit and miss affair’. This analysis is supported by evidence emanating from the social survey and research documented in chapter five of the study.

1 Hall T. – Career Development in Organisations, P 3.

The experience of career development in the Air Corps is not conducive to the intentions of Cummings and Worley (1993), who I agree with, broadly defines careers in a holistic sense by including individuals, attitudes and experiences. This probably would be the case if the Air Corps were moving from the mechanistic management style to a more organic style of management. In a bureaucratic organisation such as the Air Corps, careers are judged in terms of advancement and promotion achieved and this is where I agree with the authors. The research undertaken highlights that promotion in the Air Corps for Enlisted Personnel is problematic in terms of opportunity. Opportunity for most will be further depleted as the ‘old organisation’ converges with the ‘new organisation. The authors suggest people should plan their careers and map out career goals broadly in line with career avenues, goals, planning and development. All of the fore-going are not available to Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps. However, I agree with the merits of what the authors have examined. Gunnigle and Flood (1992), put forward a view of career development which I acknowledge. Their analysis is very similar to data emerging from the career potential section of my survey. The authors suggest… as organisations seek to establish competitive advantage through changes in workforce management which increase morale, help good employee relations, cater for changing employee expectations and increase productivity”.2 It seems likely if one could invent a yard stick to measure the preferred established norm of chapter five of the Department of Defence, Implementation Plan for the Defence Forces 1996, I would be inclined to suggest that when organisational congruence is achieved much of what Cummings and Worley (1993), suggest will be the norm in the organisation. In terms of initial and advanced training in the Air Corps, I recognise the three-stage process described by McCormick and Ilgen (1985), in chapter five of this study. The totality of my research shows this to be the case in the Air Corps. This process covers anticipatory socialisation, joining the organisation and becoming an insider. The research I have undertaken supports the view of Cummings and Worley (1993), narrative of how aging and experience influence employees careers and they outline four career stages which most employees go through. This is the establishment stage, advancement stage, maintenance stage and withdrawal stage. This model would be useful for determining career success in the ‘new organisation’ of the Air Corps. The model could not be reliably used presently as not all Enlisted Personnel have the same career opportunity. My analysis shows the Air Corps to be an unsophisticated organisation in terms of personnel structures. Only simple technical approaches to employee development exist. Most concern is centred on basic skills training, with little or no focus on employee needs for individual development through monitored progress.

2 Gunnigle P. and Flood P. – Personnel Management in Ireland. P. 172.

The fore-going discussion is positively traceable to the research question that Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps require a proactive career structure.

Further research should be conducted to determine precisely what type of structure is required, taking into consideration the bureaucratic nature and ongoing organisational development of the organisation.

Attitudes to Work

This section of the study shows some interesting trends beginning to emerge.

Despite the lack of a career structure discussed in the previous section, the majority of personnel surveyed enjoy working in the Air Corps. This finding is strengthened by respondents willing to accept extra responsibility to acquire promotion. Generally, work is not boring in the Air Corps. Stress at work is not a factor in this study. Frustration at work is a major element of employee disillusionment with the organisation. The majority of subjects under study believe that the organisation gives them job security. Personnel are confident to discuss work problems with NCO’s and Commissioned Officers. Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps feel clustered in the sense that they have little or no influence in the decision-making process attached to their jobs. The open-ended question for this section reveals a variety of reasons why personnel dislike working in the Air Corps. The majority of dislikes indicate the requirement for personnel management and a change of management style.

The above analysis reveals that problems exist in the processing of work in the Air Corps. I completely support the views of Martin (1977), in chapter three of this study. He puts forward the idea that organisations must cultivate human resources to the maximum, and where possible the organisation must engage in manpower planning and development and training. His views are supported by the research data return from my social survey.

The findings discussed are supportive of the need for professional personnel management in the Air Corps. I am satisfied that the conclusions reached support the hypothesis of the research question that personnel management is required in the Air Corps.

Organisational Communication

The majority of respondents would like to see changes in the formal system of communication in the organisation. Respondents to the survey indicated very strongly that the active ‘grapevine’ could be used more constructively. The flow of communication is mostly downward, and it is treated with suspicion by organisational members. Personnel who responded to the survey would like to see more verbal communication taking place between Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Ranks. Respondents believe upward communication is watered down as it goes through the organisation. The vast majority of respondents consider effective communication to be the key to alleviating survivor anxiety during organisational restructuring of the Air Corps. The open-ended question gives a variety of reasons for improving communication in the Air Corps.

This section of the analytical analysis indicates that serious interpersonal misalignment exists between Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Personnel including a social distance gulf between the groups.

The evidence emanating from my research supports the views expressed by Hersey and Blanchard (1988), in chapter one of this study. The authors discuss two types of communication, the star and the circle. Considering the military emphasis placed on the role tasking of the Air Corps, only the star autocratic communication system would work well in the organisation with some suitable modifications to make it more organic. The organic management style, which I prefer, put forward by Hersey and Blanchard (1988), allows for more lateral, upward and downward communication as indicated in chapter two of this study.

Confirmation is emerging from my research that the process of communication could be developed in a organic structured organisation to suit the needs of all organisational members.

I am satisfied that the findings I have discovered are traceable to the research question that the current process of communication is misaligned to the needs and wants of organisational members. In order to achieve equilibrium and taking into consideration the totality of organisational development a movement to organic management must be considered by senior officers of the Air Corps.

Trust and Motivation

A slim majority believe that there is trust between Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Ranks. Trust between subordinates and NCOs in high in the organisation. Total trust and confidence exists between Airpersons and NCO’s. The level of co-operation between Commissioned Officers and Senior NCO’s is very poor. On the other hand, the level of co-operation between NCO’s and airpersons is very high. Commissioned Officers do not seek ideas from subordinates. The majority of respondents believe that responsibility for achieving organisational goals in the Air Corps is mostly felt at the top of the organisation. People who returned data believe that Enlisted Ranks are undervalued by Commissioned Officers of the organisation. Motivation in the Air Corps is high. This can be contrasted with a positive trend emerging in terms of commitment, loyalty and motivation. The open-ended question for this section reveals many different ways of how trust and motivation can be improved in the organisation.

I agree with the views put forward by Hersey and Blanchard (1988), in chapter one of this study and my research is in agreement with the authors. The authors support the need for high trust and motivation during organisational restructuring. Results stemming from my research support the views of the authors.

Gunnigle and Flood (1992), in chapter one of the study maintain, trust and motivation can be increased by changing from traditional management, to a more people focussed style such as human resource management. The data from my study confirms this positive approach.

I am satisfied that the impact of the data in this section of my research relates to the research question.

Decision Making

It was disturbing to discover from the data returned, employees are not fully involved in decisions relating to their work. The poor level of decision making by Enlisted Personnel at work in the Air Corps is fuelling demotivation in the organisation and frustration. To overcome some of the demotivation and frustration the respondents would like to see the input of senior NCOs in planning major change and developing new operating policies and procedures in the organisation. Senior NCOs are not consulted before policy decisions are made and the respondents agree that in general policy decisions are made at the top of the organisation without consultation. From an Enlisted Persons perspective, it is only wishful thinking to believe that one can influence what happens in the Air Corps. This question sums up the negative impact of the fore going analysis. Respondents to the survey feel aggrieved that their complaints are not speedily resolved by management. The open-ended question at the end of the section reveals and confirms the extent of the negative impact and misalignment of the personnel function of Enlisted Personnel employed in the Air Corps.

To introduce a quasi-state of equilibrium between the personnel role and the technological function of the Air Corps, I agree with the views of Robbins (1991), in chapter four of my research. He acknowledges that it is essential to push authority downward in an organisation. This allows people closest and most knowledgeable about an issue to make decisions regarding that issue. A process of decentralization gives lower-level employees more control over their work. My analysis shows that if this was implemented in the Air Corps it would go a long way to introduce balance in the organisation. Hersey and Blanchard (1988), in chapter one, discuss the importance of ascertaining the level of decision making in a organisation before any change initiatives commence. The research I have undertaken indicates the importance of employees being involved in the decision-making process at work and it confirms the contribution made by the various authors mentioned in this section of the study.

I am satisfied that the findings revealed in this section of my analytical analysis confirms the need for congruence to be introduced between people and taskings. A demand exists in the Air Corps for professionalism and innovative sophistication when dealing with organisational team members. My findings are traceable to the hypothesis of the research question.

Welfare

Commissioned Officers across the Air Corps have a poor interest in the welfare of their subordinates. The strength of feeling is further amplified by respondents indicating that they are not inclined to discuss any aspects of their family life with Commissioned Officers. However, the same situation exists, that personnel are not inclined to discuss aspects of their family life with NCO’s (superiors). Enlisted Personnel are not inclined to discuss personal problems with Commissioned Officers of the Air Corps. On the other hand respondents would be more inclined to discuss a problem with an NCO of the Air Corps. The data emerging is giving rise to the social distance gulf which exists between Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Personnel. Generally, Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps would discuss a problem with a member of the Personnel Support Services. The majority of respondents believe service in the Air Corps makes a heavy demand on family life. The open ended question reveals changes respondents would like to see in occurring with the welfare function in the organisation.

I have demonstrated my research and findings can be sharply contrasted with the views of Hersey and Blanchard (1988), in chapter one of this study. The authors place much reliance on examining the motivational factors in organisations before the onset of major organisational restructuring.

I am convinced, that my research in this section of the study is traceable to the hypothesis of the research question.

Management

My research indicates that the Air Corps is not managed by competent managers. Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps believe that rigid adherence to disciplinary procedures in not indicative of good military management. The vast majority of personnel surveyed are convinced crisis management is evident in the Air Corps. The open-ended question gives a variety of reasons to indicate that management processes are in a poor condition in the Air Corps. Data from my study shows respondents indicating that the Air Corps should move from the traditional model of management to human resource management. Many respondents from the survey sample would like to see the establishment of a Personnel Management Section for all Air Corps personnel. This new section should be managed by professionally qualified personnel. A large number of the survey sample would like to see the development of a manpower policy to determine the personnel strategic strategy for organisational members. Personnel agree that a job description should be preferred for each job tasking in the organisation. My research shows, equality of opportunity is not operating satisfactorily in the organisation, across the genders and between Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Ranks. NCO’s should be more participative in the day to day management of the Air Corps.

The analysis I have undertaken shows the requirement for a manpower policy and this necessity was discussed in chapter four of the study. I have cited various reports which go back as far 1990, where management know this demand exists in the organisation. In chapter three of the study, I have dealt with personnel management issues and many of the functional aspects of personnel management are discussed. The demands of personnel management as envisaged by Martin (1981), would be of benefit to such a section being established in the Air Corps. Monks (1992/93), knowledge of the traditional/administrative personnel function can be found to be alive and well in the Air Corps. This aspect, I have discussed in chapter three of the study. Monks account of the innovative/sophisticated personnel management function, would suit the Air Corps should the organisation develop its management processes towards the organic model of management. In chapter one of my empirical research, I have described the concepts put forward by the following authors, Dupuy, Margiotta, Johnson and Bongard (1993); Thomson (1988) and Drucker (1954). All of the authors have one thing in common, they agree when management processes break down, the net result is often ‘crisis leadership / management’. My research in this section of the study confirms the above.

The findings in this section of the investigation show current military management used in the Air Corps is not aligned with the organisational development of the organisation. The evidence I have discussed which is empirical in nature is traceable to the hypothesis in the research question.

How the Air Corps would make the transition successfully from the traditional model of management to human resource model should be the subject of a separate study perhaps at PhD. level.

Organisational Culture

This section of my research reveals that Air Corps culture divides into two remote distinct groups Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Ranks. For the majority of people who responded to the survey the development of culture is important to them. Many people identify with the changing of the uniform colour from green to blue in terms of culture. The need to have organisational culture formally taught on all career courses emerges strongly from the data. Organisational members of the Air Corps believe that a culture audit, should be carried out every two to three years. This is necessary, to ensure that culture is never allowed to go into extinction and that the values and norms etc, are fully representative of all regardless of rank. The open ended question indicates what pleases or displeases respondents about existing culture in the Air Corps.

In chapter two of my research, I have discussed the merits of representative culture and the data emerging from the survey supports my conclusions of the section, military cultural apartheidism is alive and well in the Air Corps. The negative culture impact from an Enlisted Persons perspective of the existing culture can be found in the realms of authoritarianism discussed by Bass (1981), Watson (1969), Zaltman and Duncan (1977), in chapter two. My research vindicates the views of the authors in the totality of the study.

The research as presented is supportive of the hypothesis contained in the research question.

Bureaucracy

Respondents to the survey believe the Air Corps is strangled by bureaucracy. The levels of bureaucracy are inhibiting work performance in the organisation, Organisational members believe that bureaucracy is often used in the Air Corps to escape from the decision-making process. The open-ended question in this section reveals from the respondent’s perspective how the organisation can become less bureaucratic. In my presentation of the research the Air Corps would probably be more successful, if it established a clear set of task related rules and procedures. A vast majority of people within the target sample agree that the Air Corps should become less bureaucratic and develop a more organic approach to the business of the organisation.

My empirical research, shows clearly the level of bureaucracy and its consequences for the Air Corps. The findings I have discovered, would fit into the Machine Bureaucracy model expounded by Robbins (1991), in chapter two of the study. This system of management is consumed with power and control being maintained at top management levels. The system supports the disempowerment of people. In essence this is one of the major difficulties with the current management process. I also support the views of Hersey and Blanchard (1988), in chapter one of the research. My analysis confirms their view that by examining how leadership skills have developed in organisations, may assist in eroding bureaucracy from organisations.

Power

The research shows respondents agreeing, it is best to give the real reason for wanting a task to be completed rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight. It was not surprising to find that the power levels in the Air Corps are totally controlled by the Officer Corps. Enlisted Personnel feel excluded from having any sense of power at work. The majority of respondents shows that NCOs should be empowered to be more involved in the decision-making process. It was disturbing to discover from the data that Air Corps officers have a tendency to wield power to get Enlisted Ranks to perform work related tasks. Interesting data emerged that most Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps to be kind and considerate. On the other hand, Commissioned Officers of the Air Corps are not kind and considerate. The conclusion of my research shows Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps should be sufficiently empowered to assist in implementing change in the organisation. Senior NCOs should become involved with organisational policy formulation. It was most disturbing to find that Commissioned Officers generally use organisational power to create new positions for themselves, and forget about the promotional needs of Enlisted Personnel, especially during expansions of the Air Corps. The open-ended question at the end of this section reveals from a respondent’s perspective how organisational power is used in the Air Corps.

My research and the findings discussed in this section dealing with power levels in the Air Corps are in agreement with Bass (1991), in chapter one of this study, who supports the view that power can be equated with leadership. This power relationship is the key central element in the survival of the machine constituted bureaucratic organisation. This central analysis has been adequately examined in the previous section dealing with bureaucracy in the Air Corps.

I am confident that my research and findings discussed in this section of the study are traceable through the study to the hypothesis contained in the research question.

Job Design

During the course of my research and analysis of the attitudinal survey, I have discovered that jobs are not well designed in the Air Corps. Many of the respondents think incorrectly that they have job descriptions. After a thorough investigation I am satisfied that no job descriptions exist for any job in the Air Corps. Despite the fact that jobs are not well designed, respondents believe that they provide them with much variety and are significant. Career needs and wants are not matched by tasks assigned by superiors in the Air Corps. The open-ended question gives respondents views of how employment could be improved in terms of job design.

The need for effective job design in the Air Corps and its relationship to my study has already been discussed in this analysis under the following headings, attitudes to work, organisational communication, trust and motivation, decision making, welfare, management, bureaucracy and power.

The findings discussed in this section are of the study are relative to the hypothesis of the research question.

Organisation

During the course of my study I discovered, the current structure of the Air Corps is not appropriate to the business of the organisation. Research I have conducted shows, Air Corps officers successfully manage their taskings but they fail to manage the people successfully. Some units of the organisation are over-staffed and some are under-staffed. Many respondents consider the Air Corps not to be a dynamic progressive organisation to be employed in. My investigation shows that change is required to align the technology with the personnel function. Problems exist in the following areas job definition, operating procedures, span of control, decision-making and communications process. This should be considered together with the following sections of the social survey already discussed power, bureaucracy, management, decision making trust and motivation, organisational communication, attitudes to work and career potential. My research shows that people within the target sample range do not support the changes for the Defence Forces recommended in the Department of Defence, Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan, Phase 1, February 1996. The 10-year plan to introduce planned change is too long. Organisational change should be introduced over a much shorter period of 2 to 4 years. I have discovered that the negative impact of change will be resistance and this will become the norm in the organisation. This is largely due to insufficient consultation between Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps during the diagnosis stage of the change process. Respondents are not in favour of Air Corps personnel who have been professionally trained in organisational development to be involved in implementing the process of change in the organisation.

The open-ended question at the end of this section reveals a variety of reasons expressed by respondents about Enlisted Personnel of the Air Corps being prepared for the impending organisational change process.

The research I have been pursuing shows that the Air Corps is an open system. This agrees with the views of French, Bell, and Zawacki (1989), in chapter one of this study. The relevancy of the Nadler and Tushman (1980), Congruence Model of Organisational Behaviour and its application to the Air Corps has been explained throughout this study. The evidence from my social survey agrees with the view of Cummings and Worley (1993), in chapter one, that reliable planning is totally dependent on factual accurate diagnosis, supported by a plan put forward by management in agreement with the workforce. It is essential the strategy is supported by organisational members. My research indicates that pressure for change has been building up in the Air Corps for a considerable period of time. Sometimes it takes a crisis, to bring the problem to the fore an experience encountered in bureaucratic organisations. This view would be supported by Evans, Dos and Laurent (1989), in chapter one of the study. During the phasing in of organisational re alignment the danger exists for organised resistance to change to develop. The study shows that this may be the case in the Air Corps. My analysis would be supported by Watson (1969), Zaltman and Duncan (1977), in chapter one. Evidence from the research material suggests that in uncertainty, organisational members are not interested in the process of change. The view I am expounding would be supported by Kanter (1984), in chapter one of the study. Data which I have been extracting from the social survey in this section is in agreement with the views of Cummings and Worley (1993) in chapter one. The authors maintain that in over organised, mechanistic, bureaucratic organisations such as the Air Corps various functions become too rigid for increased task performance. Some examples would be static leadership styles, poor job design, over formalised organisational structure and rigid policies and procedures. In this type of organisation which I am describing the communication link between management and employees is often suppressed. This view is supported by Kolb et-al. (1984), in chapter four and my research vindicates the theory of the authors.

The Action Research Model discussed by Cummings and Worley (1993), in chapter one of this research and French and Bell (1978), view of the process is explained in the study and supported by evidence emanating from the social survey. I believe from my analysis and explanations given during the course of my empirical research the Defence Forces knowingly or unknowingly have used this model to commence building a new organisation, for serving and future generations of Irish Defence Force personnel.

After a sufficient period of time has lapsed, say ten years, I suggest a study be commenced to evaluate the success or failure of organisational change in the Irish Air Corps or the National Air Service of Ireland as it may be called by then. Such a study should be the nucleus for a PhD. thesis.

The needs of Enlisted Personnel can be served, by implementing the following recommendations.
  • Change the current style of management to HRM.
  • Reform Air Corps culture making it inclusive of the values and norms of Enlisted Personnel.
  • Establish Personnel Management Section.
  • Management training is required for all Air Corps personnel appropriate to rank.
  • A Manpower Policy is required for Enlisted Personnel
  • Prepare job descriptions/person specifications for every job in the Air Corps.
  • Empower all Enlisted Ranks according to rank level.
  • Initiate a proactive Career Structure for Enlisted Ranks.
  • Commission more NCO’s as officers.
  • Realign Commissioned Officers and NCO’s, thus eliminating the social distance gulf.
  • Improve the communication process among all ranks of the Air Corps.
  • Make honesty, transparency and accountability the values and norms for the next millennium in the Air Corps.
  • Introduce NCO pilots thus maximising the human potential within the organisation.

The congruence between the technological function and the personnel development of the Air Corps should be achieved within a reasonable time frame of say two to three years.

90 Untimely deaths recorded in Irish Air Corps toxic chemical exposure tragedy

Untimely* deaths of serving & former Irish Air Corps personnel

  • 90 verified deaths have occurred in total since 1980 
  • 77 of these deaths have occurred since 2000
  • 53 of these deaths have occurred since 2010
Either the rate of death is accelerating or we are missing many deaths from previous decades or possibly both.
 

3 most significant causes of death

  • 39% of deaths are from cancer
  • 29% deaths are from cardiac
  • At least 15 deaths are from suicide
*We record untimely as dying at or before age 66 (civilian pension age), average age of death is 52 years. We are counting deaths from medical reasons & suicide, we are not counting accidental deaths nor murder.